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We endorse Cesario’s call for more research into the complexities of “real-world” decisions and the 
comparative power of different causes of group disparities. Unfortunately, these reasonable 
suggestions are overshadowed by a barrage of non sequiturs, misdirected criticisms of methodology, 




We endorse Cesario’s call for more research into the complexities of “real-world” decisions 
and the comparative power of different causes of group disparities (Cesario et al. 2010; Brownstein 
et al. 2020; Davidson and Kelly 2020). Unfortunately, these reasonable suggestions are 
overshadowed by a barrage of non sequiturs, misdirected criticisms of methodology, and 
unsubstantiated claims about the assumptions and inferences of social psychologists. We leave the 
latter issue aside, except to express frustration that the purportedly ubiquitous “logic among social 
psychologists” is documented with a mere three citations (3), while a later discussion of real-world 
group differences is supported with 28 (11). 
Cesario’s “Missing Forces Flaw” alleges that social psychologists dismiss potential causes of 
group disparities other than bias, such as gender differences in STEM abilities or neighborhood 
crime rates in the case of police shootings. Far from ignoring such causes, however, many social 
psychologists assume them. A commonplace in social psychology is that biases are symptoms or 
mirror-like reflections of social reality (e.g., Dasgupta 2013; Forscher, Lai et al. 2019; Glaser 2014; Payne 
et al. 2017; cf. Madva 2016a). It makes little sense for Cesario to claim that social psychologists fail 
to interpret “experimental categorical effects in light of other known forces on group outcomes” 
when social psychologists also argue that experimental categorical effects are reflections of other 
known forces on group outcomes. We happen to be skeptical of the social determinism implied by 
talk of “mirror-like reflections,” but examining this idea requires more research into the nature of 
categorical biases and the ways they interact with broader social context, not less. 
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Acknowledging the need for more research does not, thankfully, commit us to the dubious 
claim that existing lab studies “cannot” provide information about real-world decisions and group 
disparities. Cesario’s all-or-nothing claims about the in-principle uninformativeness of lab studies 
obscure more difficult questions about how much researchers should update their beliefs about group 
disparities based on different lab studies. Despite one passing reference to Bayes, Cesario has no 
discussion of what it can mean for x to “provide information about” or “be evidence of” y, or, 
crucially, the difference between deductive, absolutist reasoning and inductive, probabilistic 
reasoning. Thus, ironically, Cesario inductively infers from one set of limited-information lab studies 
that other limited-information lab studies are entirely uninformative about the “real world.” Instead 
of accusing social psychologists of drawing fallacious deductive conclusions, perhaps Cesario’s 
criticisms could be reformulated to say that researchers are updating their beliefs sometimes more 
(when it comes to the explanatory power of bias) and sometimes less (when it comes to the 
explanatory power of other factors) than they should. But evaluating such claims about more fine-
grained epistemic responses to the evolving evidence would require arguments and evidence Cesario 
hasn’t provided. 
Cesario also commits a version of the fundamental attribution error he attributes to social 
psychologists. His view is that lab-based studies on bias ignore wider context. But other than a brief 
mention of “reward structure,” (50) one is left with the impression that social psychologists’ 
fallacious inferences are the cause of the problem. Cesario ignores the myriad structural incentives 
and constraints—the context!— guiding research choices. There is, for example, evidence to suggest 
that the very-warranted pressure to produce more replicable results has made social psychology less 
ecologically valid and more reliant on limited-information online studies (Sassenberg and Ditrich 
2019). An alternative version of the target article could have explored the tradeoffs and 
consequences accompanying these shifting structural incentives. 
If correct, Cesario’s arguments would impugn not just social psychology, but much of 
experimental science. In medical and pharmacological research, a decontextualized lab study testing 
how mice respond to a vaccine provides tentative evidence for how other mammals, like humans, 
will react outside the lab. Researchers adjust their prior beliefs accordingly, despite much “missing 
information,” and eventually take their research outside the lab. Social psychology lacks something 
analogous to Phase 2 and Phase 3 clinical trials presumably because it is not funded by capital or 
supported by government like medical research, not because of its “logic.” 
Cesario also accuses social psychologists of “methodological trickery” (39) by treating 
probabilistic information people use in ordinary life as bias during experiments. But this is not 
trickery; it isn’t even ecologically invalid. There are many real-world contexts in which people do and 
should suspend knowledge of probabilities, for both epistemic and moral reasons (Madva 2016b). 
When serving on a jury, you are reasonably restricted from considering certain information (e.g., the 
perceived criminality of members of the defendant’s social group). Or consider anonymous review 
in academic journals and “prestige bias.” Suppose the prestige of an author’s university affiliation 
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predicts, in some way, the quality of her submission. It would still be a separate and legitimate 
question whether the author’s affiliation should be taken into consideration by journal editors.  
Similarly, it isn’t a flaw of an experimental paradigm—or “blank slate worldism” (41)—if it 
tests whether participants can bracket some of what they know in order to discover something about 
their minds. Asking participants in a shooter task to ignore background base rates, such as the 
likelihood, given their race, that a person is holding a gun, is entirely appropriate for the epistemic aim 
of determining that bias exists and for learning how it operates under certain conditions. Learning 
this about bias is different than learning about what causes it to exist or what effects it has under 
other conditions, but all of this is worth knowing.   
Setting aside the target article’s non sequiturs and melodrama, what remains are familiar 
challenges faced by any science striving to generalize and apply its results. A final irony, then, is that 
many of the improvements to the experimental and theoretical paradigms that Cesario discusses—
simulator studies of shooting decisions, recognition that implicit biases aren’t unconscious—are due 
to the kind of work done by social psychologists and their fellow travelers in adjacent disciplines. 
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